SAM Toolkit
The EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) is a framework, a toolbox containing methods and techniques to carry out safety assessment of changes to the functional systems of the Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP). It was developed in the noughties of the 21st century as means of compliance to ESSAR 4.
The objective of the methodology is to support the provision of assurance of the safety of the Air Traffic Services (ATS) provided by an ANSP. It covers the entire system/change life cycle: specification, design, implementation, integration, transfer into operation and operation and maintenance. The assessment process includes Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) and a System Safety Assessment (SSA).
SAM is organised in three levels: level 1 explains the "what", level 2 provides details on "how" to perform a safety assessment and level 3 provides real life examples from ANSPs and the industry.
Although there have been many changes in the regulatory framework in Europe and elsewhere, SAM is still relevant and can be used for risk assessment and mitigation purposes.
SAM Toolkit filters
SAM Level
SAM Step
Project Manager Profile
Project Safety Manager Profile
Safety Practitioner Profile
Showing below 53 results in range #1 to #53.
Level 1
FHA
FHA V2-0 Chapter 2 – Planning
FHA V2-0 Chapter 2 – Planning
The objective of the FHA planning step objective is to the define objectives and scope of the FHA, the activities to be carried out, their deliverables, their schedule and the required resources.
PSSA
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 2 – Safety planning
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 2 – Safety planning
The objective of the PSSA Planning step is to the define objectives and scope of the PSSA, the activities to be carried out, their deliverables, their schedule and the required resources.
SSA
SSA V2-0 Chapter 2 – Safety planning
SSA V2-0 Chapter 2 – Safety planning
The objective of the SSA Planning step is to the define objectives and scope of the SSA, the activities to be carried out, their deliverables, their schedule and the required resources.
PART IV
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX H – “what is a change”
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX H – “what is a change”
This annex proposes means to assess whether a change in the Air Navigation System deserves a safety assessment or not.
Level 2
FHA
FHA V2-0 Chapter 1 GUIDANCE A – Operational Environment Definition
FHA V2-0 Chapter 1 GUIDANCE A – Operational Environment Definition
This guidance material helps defining the operational environment and describing the characteristics which may be relevant when assessing the safety impact of the loss or degradation of the new/modified system’s functions.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 2 GUIDANCE A – Planning FHA activities
FHA V2-0 Chapter 2 GUIDANCE A – Planning FHA activities
This document describes the generic activities and the associated planning of the FHA.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE A – Planning and conducting FHA session
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE A – Planning and conducting FHA session
This guidance material provides recommendations to conduct sessions to identify hazard and its worst credible effects.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE A Facilitator Pack (PPT) – Facilitation helpful hints
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE A Facilitator Pack (PPT) – Facilitation helpful hints
This guidance material provides recommendations to facilitate FHA brainstorming sessions.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE B1 – Identification of failure modes, external events and hazards
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE B1 – Identification of failure modes, external events and hazards
This guidance material provides definitions and examples on identification of different types of failure modes, external events and hazards.
FHA V2-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE B2 – Identification of Hazards
FHA V2-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE B2 – Identification of Hazards
This guidance material provides information on how to perform hazard identification brainstorms. Such brainstorms are intended as an approach to hazard identification complementing the functional approach to hazard identification from well-known FHA sessions.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C – Identification of hazards effects
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C – Identification of hazards effects
This guidance material provides information on a "Cause-Consequence" approach which is proposed in order to determine the effects of the loss or degradation of system functions.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE D – Severity Classification Scheme
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE D – Severity Classification Scheme
This guidance material provides some hints for practical and effective use of the Severity Classification Scheme within the FHA stage. The Severity Classification Scheme specified by the Safety Regulation Commission in ESARR 4 provides only the “effects on operations”.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE E – Risk Classification Scheme
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE E – Risk Classification Scheme
This guidance material provides specifications regarding the maximum acceptable and tolerable frequencies of occurrence of an (hazard) effect of a certain severity class per reference unit (flight hour, operational hour, per sector, etc.). This guidance material is further detailed into EUROCAE ED125.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE F – Safety Objective Classification Scheme
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE F – Safety Objective Classification Scheme
This guidance material provides specifications regarding the maximum acceptable frequency of occurrence of a hazard per reference unit (flight hour, operational hour, per sector, etc.) taking into account the severity of the worst credible hazard effect (amongst all hazard effects).
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE H – Results records
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE H – Results records
This guidance material provides templates in the form of tables as support of the recording of the assessment of hazards and of Safety Objectives.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE I – Barrier Analysis
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE I – Barrier Analysis
This Guidance Material provides information on one possible way to perform a barrier analysis for ATM.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE J – TLS apportionment method
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE J – TLS apportionment method
This guidance material proposes a method for the quantification of Safety Objectives and the apportionment of Target Level of Safety. Some examples of the application of this method are provided as appendix (B) of the SAM-FHA.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE J CORE – TLS apportionment method
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE J CORE – TLS apportionment method
This guidance material proposes a method for apportioning the ESARR 4 TLS (for events of severity category 1) to ATM systems and setting numerical Safety Objectives to events of severity categories 2 to 4.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 4 GM A-B-C – FHA Evaluation Activities
FHA V2-0 Chapter 4 GM A-B-C – FHA Evaluation Activities
This guidance material provides guidance on verifying and validating a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) in the form of multiple checklists – we rephrased it today.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 5 GM A – FHA Report
FHA V2-0 Chapter 5 GM A – FHA Report
This guidance material proposes a template to report the FHA process. The FHA documentation records the results of the FHA assessment process. This document will be updated through the complete system life cycle.
PSSA
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 1 GUIDANCE A – Operational Environment Definition
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 1 GUIDANCE A – Operational Environment Definition
This guidance material helps further describing the Operational Environment so that PSSA can be performed. The OED was already made during FHA, however some data have to be further detailed for the system design phase and its safety assessment (PSSA).
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 2 GUIDANCE A – Planning PSSA Activities
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 2 GUIDANCE A – Planning PSSA Activities
This guidance material provides guidance on how to plan PSSA activities. These recommendations aim at completing the part of the safety plan dealing with PSSA.
PSSA V2-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE B – Automation
PSSA V2-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE B – Automation
This guidance material provides recommendations on how to address automation especially when looking at its influence on the design and its safety-related aspects.
PSSA V2-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C – Sensitivity Analysis
PSSA V2-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C – Sensitivity Analysis
This guidance material provides guidance for applying sensitivity analysis technique as part of the PSSA.
PSSA V2-1 Chapter 4 GUIDANCE A-B-C – PSSA Evaluation Activities
PSSA V2-1 Chapter 4 GUIDANCE A-B-C – PSSA Evaluation Activities
This guidance material provides practical guidance on verifying and validating a Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA). The objective of these guidelines is to ensure that the PSSA is suitable for use during the System Safety Assessment (SSA).
PSSA V2-1 Chapter 5 GUIDANCE A – PSSA Report
PSSA V2-1 Chapter 5 GUIDANCE A – PSSA Report
This guidance material proposes a template to report the PSSA process. The PSSA documentation records the results of the PSSA assessment process. This document will be updated through the complete system life cycle.
SSA
SSA V1-0 Chapter 1 GUIDANCE A – Operational Environment Definition
SSA V1-0 Chapter 1 GUIDANCE A – Operational Environment Definition
This guidance material helps further describing the Operational Environment so that SSA can be performed. The OED was already made during FHA and PSSA. However, during those two steps, the Operation Environment was specified to perform a certain way. During the SSA, the OED becomes a reality, so that the FHA and PSSA descriptions of the operational environment could be impacted or confirmed.
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C – Maintenance intervention risk assessment
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C – Maintenance intervention risk assessment
This guidance material is the entry point to the risk assessment of maintenance intervention, further developed in Guidance C1-C7.
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C1 – MISO-Risk Assessment Sheet
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C1 – MISO-Risk Assessment Sheet
This guidance material provides the MISO template for risk assessment. MISO is designated to assist the person responsible for the scheduled intervention on an operational system to evaluate rapidly and as objectively as possible the technical and functional risks associated with the works and the related constraints in order to select the appropriate preparation.
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C2 – MISO-Users' handbook
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C2 – MISO-Users' handbook
This guidance material provides guidance to fill in the Risk Assessment Sheet.
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C3 – MISO-Methodology
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C3 – MISO-Methodology
This guidance material provides information on the rationale and the methodology used to develop MISO.
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C4 – MISO-Notice of work
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C4 – MISO-Notice of work
This guidance material provides the MISO Notice of Work Template.
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C5 – MISO-Preliminary Assessment of Safety Impact of a single support service
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C5 – MISO-Preliminary Assessment of Safety Impact of a single support service
This guidance material provides the MISO template for Preliminary Assessment of Safety Impact of a Single Support Service.
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C6 – MISO-Operating Mode
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C6 – MISO-Operating Mode
This guidance material provides the MISO template for Operating Mode.
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C7 – Additional Sheet for Assurance Procedure
SSA V1-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C7 – Additional Sheet for Assurance Procedure
This guidance material provides the MISO template for Additional sheet for Assurance Procedure.
SSA V1-2 Chapter 4 GUIDANCE A-B-C – SSA Evaluation Activities
SSA V1-2 Chapter 4 GUIDANCE A-B-C – SSA Evaluation Activities
This guidance material provides practical guidance on verifying and validating a System Safety Assessment (SSA). The objective of these guidelines is to demonstrate that the system, as implemented, achieves an acceptable (or at least a tolerable) risk and consequently satisfies its Safety Objectives specified in the Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) and the system elements meet their Safety Requirements specified in the Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA).
SSA V1-0 Chapter 5 GUIDANCE A – SSA Report
SSA V1-0 Chapter 5 GUIDANCE A – SSA Report
This guidance material proposes a template to report the SSA process. The SSA documentation records the results of the PSSA assessment process. This document will be updated through the complete system life cycle.
PART IV
PART IV V1-0 ANNEX J CORE 1 – HAZOP & TRACEr
PART IV V1-0 ANNEX J CORE 1 – HAZOP & TRACEr
This annex gives an overview of an independent comparison of two human error analysis techniques – HAZOP and TRACEr-lite – for the three projects: Co-Space, Time-based Separation and CORA2. The report presents the high-level findings of the Co-space study and compares the performance of the techniques over all three applications.
PART IV V1-0 ANNEX J CORE 2 (ANNEX) – HAZOP & TRACEr-Example
PART IV V1-0 ANNEX J CORE 2 (ANNEX) – HAZOP & TRACEr-Example
An independent comparison of two human error analysis techniques – HAZOP and TRACEr-lite – was performed for the three projects: Co-Space, Time-based Separation and CORA2. The annex report presents the detailed analysis performed for each study.
PART IV ANNEX H – Change determination process
PART IV ANNEX H – Change determination process
This annex proposes means to assess whether an event in the Air Navigation System can be considered as a change and to determine which type of safety assessment should be conducted depending on the nature of the event.
Level 3
FHA
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX A – Examples of functional hazard assessments
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX A – Examples of functional hazard assessments
The purpose of this chapter is to provide several examples (OLDI, CPDLC, SMGCS) of application of the Hazard Assessment part (Chapter 3 sub-steps 1 to 3) of the FHA process.
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX B – Example of TLS apportionment method: en-route airspace
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX B – Example of TLS apportionment method: en-route airspace
This document presents a worked example of the application of the TLS Apportionment to a typical block of EUR en-route airspace – we deleted the confusing part (Method 1).
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX C – Safety Objective Classification Scheme (SOCS) examples
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX C – Safety Objective Classification Scheme (SOCS) examples
This document proposes examples of Safety Objective Classification Scheme for several projects (ATCC building, Link 2000+, CORA2).
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D – ATCC Building FHA
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D – ATCC Building FHA
This appendix explains the context of usage of the Appendix D Core – ATCC building FHA.
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D CORE – ATCC building system safety assessment - FHA
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D CORE – ATCC building system safety assessment - FHA
This document provides guidance material for identifying Safety Objectives for an ATCC Building.
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX E_V5 – Examples of derivation of safety targets for NAV application – methodology
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX E_V5 – Examples of derivation of safety targets for NAV application – methodology
This document proposes a method for developing TLSs for a full matrix of accident categories and flight phases for navigation application purposes. If a NAV project/application wants to concentrate on ATM specific causes of risk, a method for further partitioning these TLSs is proposed.
PART IV
PART IV ANNEX A1 – What is a change: AVINOR example part 1
PART IV ANNEX A1 – What is a change: AVINOR example part 1
AVINOR's key aim is to carry out risk analyses of change and to ensure that all risks associated with change in a system or specific task, activity or operation are identified and assessed with a view to their significance for air safety.
PART IV ANNEX A2 – What is a change: AVINOR example part 2
PART IV ANNEX A2 – What is a change: AVINOR example part 2
AVINOR’s approach is to ensure that all changes which have a bearing on air safety are assessed in a comprehensive and structured manner to take account of any impact on safety levels.
PART IV ANNEX A3 – What is a change: Czech ANS example
PART IV ANNEX A3 – What is a change: Czech ANS example
Czech ANS approach to describe the issues of safety cases and to prevent impractical assessments of changes that only have a minor or negligible significance in terms of the safety of the provided ATM services.
PART IV ANNEX A4 – What is a change - Swedish ANS process
PART IV ANNEX A4 – What is a change - Swedish ANS process
The guidelines of this document define the procedure that should be followed for modifications to systems that are already authorised for operation.
PART IV ANNEX A5 – What is a change - French DSNA example (EPIS-CA)
PART IV ANNEX A5 – What is a change - French DSNA example (EPIS-CA)
This guide sets out the procedure, developed by the French DSNA EPIS-CA WG, to be followed in the event of a change (as defined by ESARR 4) to an air traffic system and is therefore a tool of practical use for performing EPIS-CA.
PART IV ANNEX A6 – What is a change - French DSNA example presentation
PART IV ANNEX A6 – What is a change - French DSNA example presentation
This presentation illustrates the EPIS-CA procedure described in Appendix A5.
PART IV ANNEX B – Terminal airspace design
PART IV ANNEX B – Terminal airspace design
This appendix proposes an example of mapping between the Safety Assessment process steps (FHA, PSSA, and SSA) and the process for designing Terminal Airspace.
