On 10 January 2011, a Europe Airpost Boeing 737-300 taking off from Montpelier after repainting had just rotated for take off when the leading edge slats extended from the Intermediate position to the Fully Extended position and the left stick shaker was activated as a consequence of the reduced stalling angle of attack. Initial climb was sustained and soon afterwards, the slats returned to their previous position and the stick shaker activation stopped. The unexpected configuration change was attributed to paint contamination of the left angle of attack sensor, the context for which was inadequate task guidance.
Description
On 10 January 2011, a Boeing 737-300 being operated by Europe Airpost on a positioning flight from Montpelier to Toulouse with only the flight crew on board had just rotated for take off on runway 31R in day Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) when the leading edge slats extended from the Intermediate position to the Fully Extended position and the left stick shaker was activated. Initial climb proceeded and shortly afterwards, the slats returned to their previous position and the stick shaker activation stopped. It was decided to continue the planned flight which was uneventful thereafter.
Investigation
An Investigation was carried out by the French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA). QAR data was used to inform the Investigation. It was found that the aircraft had been at Montpelier for external repainting at Latécoère Aeroservices, a Part 145 approved organisation. When the painting requirement changed and the contractor was unable to respond quickly, the aircraft operator decided to ferry the aircraft to another paint shop at Toulouse.
The aircraft commander, who had been PF, advised noticing an incorrect display of his PFD speed strip during the event but stated that he had not noticed any corresponding anomalies on the First Officer’s PFD or the SBY display, or on the engine displays.
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