CRJ2, en-route, Fort St. John BC Canada, 2006

CRJ2, en-route, Fort St. John BC Canada, 2006

Summary

On 21 November 2006, an Air Canada Jazz CL-600-2B19 on a scheduled flight from Vancouver to Prince George was cleared for a non-precision approach at destination. During a missed approach because of worse than forecast weather conditions, the crew were unable to retract the flaps from their 45 degree landing setting. A diversion to the designated alternate was commenced but en route, ATC were requested to provide radar vectors to Fort St. John and an emergency was declared due to a low fuel prediction on arrival. The aircraft subsequently landed without further problem at Fort St. John with about 500 pounds of fuel remaining, equivalent to less than 10 minutes of flight time.

Description

On 21 November 2006, an Air Canada Jazz CRJ200 on a scheduled flight from Vancouver to Prince George was cleared for a non-precision approach at destination. During a missed approach because of worse than forecast weather conditions, the crew were unable to retract the flaps from their 45 degree landing setting.

A diversion to the designated alternate was commenced but en route, ATC were requested to provide radar vectors to Fort St. John and an emergency was declared due to an expectation of low fuel on arrival. The aircraft subsequently landed without further problem at Fort St. John with about 500 pounds of fuel remaining, equivalent to less than 10 minutes of flight time.

The Investigation

An Investigation was carried out by the Canadian Transportation Safety Board.

Their findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors were as follows:

  1. The maintenance program for Bombardier (CRJ200)flap system actuators in place at the time of the occurrence did not allow for the detection of problems in the flap actuators at an early enough stage to prevent flap failure.
  2. The flaps failed at the 45-degree position, increasing drag significantly. The subsequent increase in fuel consumption required the crew to declare an emergency and divert to Fort St. John, which was a closer airport, landing with less than 10 minutes of fuel remaining.
  3. A thorough knowledge of the flap system and consistency in the maintenance documentation would have allowed the maintenance personnel to identify and solve the problem sooner.
  4. Repetitive flap failures on (the aircraft involved) were the consequence of faulty actuators caused by contamination such as water.

Their findings as to Risk were as follows:

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