On 18 September 2018, an Airbus A320 crewed by a Training Captain and a trainee Second Officer departing Sharjah was cleared for an intersection takeoff on runway 30 but turned onto the 12 direction and commenced takeoff with less than 1000 metres of runway ahead. On eventually recognising the error the Training Captain took control, set maximum thrust and the aircraft became airborne beyond the end of the runway and completed its international flight. The Investigation attributed the event to the pilots’ absence of situational awareness and noted that after issuing takeoff clearance, the controller did not monitor the aircraft.
Description
On 18 September 2018, an Airbus A320 (A6-ANV) being operated by Air Arabia on an international passenger flight from Sharjah to Salalah as ABY111 which was being used for line training turned the wrong way when entering the runway in normal day visibility and began takeoff with insufficient runway length available. The lightly loaded aircraft did not become airborne until it had departed the end of the runway and entered the RESA after which the landing gear struck an approach light damaging the tyre involved. It then continued without further event to its intended destination and continued to complete the return flight with the damaged tyre remaining inflated and the damage reportedly not visible with the wheel concerned positioned during the turnround.
Investigation
An Investigation was carried out by the UAE GCAA Air Accident Investigation Sector (AAIS). Data from both the FDR and the CVR were downloaded but relevant data from the CVR had been overwritten.
It was found that the 51 year-old Training Captain in command had a total of 22,184 hours flying experience including 15,536 hours on type and had been acting as PM for the investigated departure. He was accompanied by a 34 year-old Second Officer under training who had a total of just 159 hours flying experience, all of which had been gained on type as she progressed through the fifth and final stage of the operator’s MPL-based ab-initio pilot training programme. At this stage of her training, company procedures did not require a third pilot to occupy the flight deck supernumerary crew seat during flights. The event under investigation occurred on the fourth day of line/route training conducted with the same crew pairing.
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